This paper examines the strategic interaction of a defendant and a prosecutor during the plea bargaining process. A four-stage game of incomplete information is developed where the defendant's guilt or innocence is private information but the amount of resources available to the prosecutor is common knowledge. The basic result of the paper is that equilibrium is semi-separating; the plea offer is accepted by a proportion of the guilty defendants and is rejected by all of the innocent defendants and the remaining guilty defendants. In this model an increase in the resources available to the prosecutor increases the proportion of guilty defendants who accept plea offers. Although the prosecutor is unable to generate complete separation of the guilty and innocent defendants through the plea bargaining process, prosecutorial resources are beneficial from a societal standpoint. 
Introduction
Plea bargaining between the prosecutor and the criminal defendant is an essential part of the criminal justice process. The prosecutor's decisions regarding the length of the plea bargain sentence to o¤er, the types of cases to plea bargain, and the best time to expend resources gathering evidence depend critically on the anticipated response of the defendant. On the other hand, the defendant's choice whether to accept or reject a plea o¤er depends critically on the anticipated behavior of the prosecutor. This strategic interaction means that any question pertaining to plea bargaining should be analyzed in a game theoretic fashion. The model developed in this paper seeks to address several issues concerning the plea bargaining process. First, is the prosecutor able to extract information regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence through the plea bargaining process? Second, what role does the anticipated resource expenditure by the prosecutor play in the defendant's decision to accept or reject the plea o¤er? That is, does the threat of a large resource expenditure on a criminal case by a prosecutor induce guilty defendants to accept severe plea bargain o¤ers? Third, when is it optimal for a prosecutor to expend resources gathering evidence -before or after plea bargaining? Finally, can a prosecutor ever achieve complete separation guilty and innocent defendants through a combination of the plea bargaining process and prior or subsequent resource expenditures?
Prosecutors operate on the federal, state, and local level. Each prosecutorial o¢ce receive a budget a portion of which is earmarked for prosecution. On the state level the average budget for a prosecutorial o¢ce serving a population of more than 1 million was $25.5 million in 1996 (see DeFrances and Steadman (1998) ). On the federal level the prosecution budget was $2.4 million in 1998 and it is projected to grow to $2.9 million by 2004 (see Executive O¢ce of the President (1994, p. 314)) 1 . Given these facts, it appears necessary to examine how resource availability impacts the relative bargaining power of the prosecutor during the plea bargaining process. That is, does the availability of a large prosecution budget give the prosecutor an advantage when plea bargaining with the defendant? If so, what is the nature of the advantage and does it warrant such a large resource expenditure?
To answer these questions the model is set up as a four stage game of 1 incomplete information. The defendants in this game are the only players with private information (they know their guilt or innocence), all other information is common knowledge. Both the defendant and the prosecutor know the amount of resources available to the prosecutor, the probability of being convicted upon being taken to trial, what evidence investigation by the prosecutor will reveal, and how this evidence will impact the probability of trial conviction. The basic result of the model is that if the crime is su¢ciently severe, then equilibrium is semi-separating; a proportion of the guilty defendants accept the plea o¤ers and the remaining of the guilty and all of the innocent defendants reject the plea o¤ers. In this equilibrium, an increase in the resources available to the prosecutor increases the proportion of guilty who choose to accept this o¤er. The introduction of resource expenditures into a plea bargaining model forces the prosecutor to update her beliefs about the defendant's type two times. That is, the prosecutor receives information in two separate ways at two di¤erent times. One way is through her observation of the defendant's rejection or acceptance of the plea o¤er, and another way is through her gathering of evidence. Only after the prosecutor is armed with both these sets of information does she decide whether to go to trial. Landes (1971) is the seminal article on plea bargaining and resource expenditure by the prosecutor. In Landes' article the prosecutor maximizes the number of convictions subject to a budget constraint. In Landes' model all defendants are assumed to be guilty; thus, there is no relationship between resource expenditures and information revelation. This relationship is explored in the model developed in this paper. Landes (1971) , as well as a more recent paper by Kobayashi and Lott (1996) , look at how the resource expenditure by the prosecutor in ‡uences the probability of conviction. Instead of focusing on this role of resources (although in our model resource expenditures do impact the probability of conviction), we look at how the expenditure of resources a¤ects the prosecutor's decision whether to go to trial. Furthermore, we also look at the impact of resource expenditure on the prosecutor's relative bargaining power during the plea bargaining session. Grossman and Katz (1983) o¤er the …rst game theoretic model of plea bargaining. They conclude that the prosecutor can use the plea bargaining process as an e¤ective screening device. In their model the defendant's response to the plea o¤er perfectly reveals his guilt or innocence. A disturbing feature of their model is that the prosecutor only takes to trial defendants which she knows are innocent. Because at trial there is a chance that the defendant will be wrongly convicted, it is in the best interest of the prosecutor to dismiss the case once she knows the defendant is innocent. Therefore, the separating equilibrium in Grossman and Katz's model rests on the idea that the prosecutor can credibly commit to trial after a plea is rejected. This commitment, in practice, is inherently non-credible because any defendant that the prosecutor knows for sure is innocent will never stand trial.
The next major step in the plea bargaining literature was made by Reinganum (1988) . Reinganum developed a model where the defendant has private information about his guilt or innocence and the prosecutor has private information about the strength of her case. Reinganum's paper contains two main results: …rst, when the prosecutor has unlimited discretion, a plea o¤er may (depending on the parameter values) perfectly reveal the strength of the prosecutor's case. In this case, both the innocent and the guilty defendant may reject the o¤er and go to trial.
2 Second, when the prosecutor has restricted discretion, she may make a plea o¤er (depending on the parameters of the model) which the guilty accept and the innocent reject. Reinganum's model with restricted discretion has the same feature as the Grossman and Katz's model -that is, only the innocent go to trial. This does not happen in the model developed in this paper because the prosecutor makes a decision whether to go to trial after the plea bargaining session.
The model most similar to the model developed in this paper is in a paper by Lewis and Poitevin (1997) . Lewis and Poitevin present a model of regulatory proceedings in which …rms reveal some of their private information to the regulatory commission through their choice to disclose evidence during the regulatory proceedings. In their model equilibrium is semi-separating; good …rms always disclose information while some bad …rms do and some bad …rms do not disclose information.
In the model developed in this paper equilibrium is also semi-separating; all innocent defendants and a proportion of the guilty defendants reject the plea o¤er while the remaining guilty defendants accept the plea o¤er. Contrary to Lewis and Poitevin, in our model the party with private information moves second. That is, the prosecutor o¤ers the plea and the defendant accepts or rejects that o¤er. This increases the bargaining power of the pros-ecutor. Because there is a common sense notion that prosecutors make the initial plea o¤er, it makes sense to model the plea bargaining process in this fashion.
3 Section 2 of the paper develops the model and explores the relationship between resource expenditure and the revelation of evidence. Section 3 contains the paper's main results. Section 4 o¤ers some thoughts on the welfare and e¢ciency implications of the model. Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
The Model
The defendants in this model are of two possible types (g for guilty and i for innocent). Initially, the prosecutor has a prior probability distribution of p and (1 ¡ p) over the defendant's possible types. Where p is the prosecutor's initial belief that the defendant is guilty and (1 ¡ p) is her initial belief that the defendant is innocent. Throughout the analysis we assume that p > 1 2 . That is, the prosecutor's initial belief is that the defendant is more likely than not guilty. This assumption stems from the fact that police need a certain amount of evidence (probable cause) before making an arrest. If the police initially think that a suspect is more likely than not innocent then an arrest will not occur, and, correspondingly, the case will not appear on the docket of the prosecutor.
The structure of the game is as follows: …rst, the defendant is brought before the prosecutor and accused of committing a crime x. The value of x represents the severity of the crime. For example, a robbery charge would take on a small value of x whereas a murder charge would take on a large value of x. One can think of x as the amount of jail time served for a particular crime upon conviction. We assume that for every possible crime there exists only one value of x. Second, the prosecutor o¤ers a plea bargain (q) to the defendant. The defendant then accepts (A) or rejects (R) the plea o¤er. If the plea is accepted the game ends. If the plea is rejected, the prosecutor spends resources gathering evidence. Finally, the prosecutor decides whether to go to trial. The prosecutor is assumed to gather evidence after the plea bargain session; as we will discuss at the end of Section 3, our results would not change if instead evidence were gathered before plea bargaining.
The gathering of evidence provides the prosecutor with information regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence. There naturally exists a trade-o¤ between the cost of gathering evidence and the value of the information revealed by the evidence. Evidence is useful to the prosecutor for three reasons. First, evidence can help the prosecutor win the case once it goes to trial. This role is explored fully by Landes (1971) as well as by Kobayashi and Lott (1996) . Second, evidence could provide enough information pointing to the defendant's innocence that the prosecutor would drop the case before it could go to trial. In this instance society saves the social cost of trial, and the social cost of a potential wrongful conviction. Third, the threat to gather evidence can be used by the prosecutor to induce a portion of the guilty defendants to accept severe plea bargain o¤ers. All three roles of evidence are explored in this paper.
Both evidence and resource expenditure are very general terms in this model. Evidence encompasses anything which leads the prosecutor to revise her beliefs about the defendant's type; whereas prosecutorial resources are anything used to investigate and prosecute a defendant. The relationship between resource expenditures and amount of evidence collected is necessarily increasing. That is, as the prosecutor devotes more and more resources to investigating a case, more and more evidence is collected.
Evidence provides the prosecutor with a signal concerning the defendant's type. The more resources spent by the prosecutor the more accurate the evidence signal she receives. Formally, let s and s represent two possible evidence signals. Let s be the signal the prosecutor most commonly associates with the guilty defendant, and let s be the signal she most commonly associates with the innocent defendant. To simplify the analysis we will assume that the signal s is interpreted by the prosecutor as clear evidence that the defendant is innocent; that is, the prosecutor believes that if the defendant is guilty then the probability of a signal s is zero. It is easiest to construe the signal s in one of two ways: (1) it represents the signal received by the prosecutor when she …nds a person other than the defendant to confess to the crime at issue or (2) it represents the signal received by the prosecutor when she discovers the defendant's alibi is rock solid. 4 Given 4 Note that the probability of these events increases with the amount of resources the these assumptions, the evidence signaling technology can be represented by the conditional probability measure,
where M is the amount of prosecutorial resources spent gathering evidence.
To further de…ne the evidence signalling technology let ¾(¢) be a di¤erentiable function in the interval ¡ 1 2 ; 1 ¤ . For the evidence signal to get more accurate as the amount of resources spent by the prosecutor increases the following condition must hold:
The type of evidence gathered a¤ects the probability of conviction at trial. Let the following denote the probability that the defendant is convicted at trial given his type and given that the observed evidence signal is s.
probfguilty type and convicted at trial j s = s g prob fguilty typeg ¼ i (s) = probfinnocent type and convicted at trial j s = sg prob finnocent typeg Let ¼ g and ¼ i be the corresponding probabilities if the evidence gathered is s. In the hope of capturing some of the structural aspects of the court system we assume the probability an innocent defendant is convicted at trial is less than the probability a guilty defendant is convicted at trial. Hence, the following condition must hold:
Implicit in this assumption is that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Therefore, the court system is more likely to convict a truly guilty defendant than a truly innocent defendant. A similar assumption is made in Grossman and Katz (1983) and Reinganum (1988) . Furthermore, the probability that a prosecutor puts toward investigating the case.
guilty or an innocent defendant is convicted at trial is higher if the evidence is s than if the evidence is s; that is,
The prosecutor's strategy in this model consists of a plea bargain o¤er q, and a trial decision function µ : R + £ S ! [0; 1], where R + represents the space of all possible plea o¤ers and S = fs; sg. Thus, µ(q; s) is the probability that the prosecutor goes to trial in the …nal stage of the game if a plea o¤er of q is rejected and a signal s is observed.
The prosecutor receives a payo¤ of x if a guilty defendant serves a jail term of length x, and a payo¤ of ¡x if an innocent defendant receives a jail term of length x. The prosecutor receives no payo¤ for setting an innocent defendant free, and a payo¤ of ¡¸x for setting a guilty defendant free (where¸2 (0; 1)). Thus, the prosecutor prefers more jail time to less for guilty defendants and the opposite for innocent defendants. Moreover, the prosecutor prefers setting the guilty defendant accused of crime free to convicting an innocent defendant. The prosecutor's expected payo¤ depends on the equilibrium strategies of each defendant as well as her beliefs about the defendant's type. Moreover, the prosecutor su¤ers a cost of c¸0 if she loses at trial and the defendant is set free. This cost can be thought of as a political reputation loss. This assumption is consistent with the literature that speci…es conviction maximization as the prosecutor's objective function (see Ramseyer and Rasmusen (1999) ). Thus, any trial loss diminishes the prosecutor's utility. Given these assumptions about the prosecutor's preferences, one can de…ne her expected payo¤ after a plea of q has been rejected and the signal s 2 fs; ¹ sg has been observed as follows:
where
represents the updated beliefs of the prosecutor given the equilibrium strategies of each defendant type, rejection of the plea, and the signal observed. Let ¹[gjq] be the prosecutor's belief that the defendant is guilty after rejection of the plea, but before observing the signal. Then ¹[gjq; ¹ s] is de…ned as follows:
Since a signal s is clear evidence that the defendant is innocent, ¹ [gj q; s] = 0 and ¹ [ij q; s] = 1 for all plea o¤ers q. Given that the prosecutor only wants to convict guilty defendants (see equation (3)), µ(q; s) = 0 maximizes the prosecutor's utility; that is, an optimal decision function must require that µ(q; s) = 0 for all plea o¤ers q.
Each defendant type has an expected payo¤ which depends on the crime charged, the plea o¤er (which he accepts, A, or rejects, R), the court cost k he incurs if he goes to trial, and the probability that the prosecutor takes the case to trial. Given these parameters, the sequence of moves in the game, and the evidence signalling technology, the strategy for the guilty defendant consists of a function G(q) which speci…es the probability that he rejects the plea o¤er q. If he rejects the plea o¤er and the case goes to trial he incurs a cost equal to his court costs plus his expected punishment (x times the probability of conviction). On the other hand, if he accepts the plea o¤er he incurs only the cost associated with the punishment speci…ed by q. Given these preferences, the guilty defendant chooses a strategy G(q) to maximize the following expected utility function:
Similarly, the innocent defendant's strategy consists of a strategy I(q) which speci…es the probability that he rejects the plea o¤er q. The innocent defendant chooses I(q) to maximize the following expected utility function:
Notice that the strategies of the guilty and the innocent defendant can be di¤erent. This allows for the possibility that an innocent defendant will reject a plea o¤er that a guilty defendant will accept. Thus, there is nothing in the defendant's payo¤ structure which precludes the possibility that a defendant's response could provide information to the prosecutor.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game is a strategy pro…le¯¤ = fI
s] which satisfy the following conditions:
² At each information set where a player makes a decision, he maximizes his expected payo¤ given the strategy choices and beliefs of the other players.
² The beliefs ¹ ¤ [gj q; s] of the prosecutor are derived as follows:
-Whenever an information set is on the equilibrium path the prosecutor's beliefs are derived form the equilibrium strategies and the observed actions using Bayes rule.
-Whenever an information set is o¤ the equilibrium path the prosecutor's beliefs constitute a probability distribution over the defendant's possible types. 
Equilibria
The plea bargaining literature up to this point has focused on a separating equilibrium where the guilty defendant always accepts the plea o¤er and the innocent defendant always rejects the plea o¤er. The problem with this approach, as previously stated, is that it relies on a non-credible threat by the prosecutor. The model developed in this section allows the prosecutor to use both the information she uncovers from the plea bargaining process and the subsequent evidence signal in order to make her decision whether to go to trial. This additional modi…cation is more in tune with how the legal system works and e¤ectively rules out any separating equilibria.
Proposition 1 There exists no separating equilibria where the defendant completely reveals his type through the plea bargaining process.
Proof. Suppose a separating equilibrium exists where all of the innocent defendants accept the plea o¤er and all of the guilty defendants reject it. In order for an innocent defendant to accept a plea o¤er it must be less than his expected sentence (inclusive of the court cost), q < µ(q; s)(1¡¾)(¼ i x+k). On the other hand, for a guilty defendant to reject a plea o¤er it must be greater than his expected sentence, q > µ(q; s)(¼ g x + k). No plea satis…es both these inequalities because the guilty defendant's expected trial sentence is always greater than the innocent defendant's expected trial sentence (¼ g > ¼ i by assumption). Therefore, this type of separating equilibrium cannot exist. Suppose a separating equilibrium exists in which all of the guilty defendants accept the plea o¤er and all of the innocent defendants reject the plea o¤er. If this is the case, upon observing rejection, the prosecutor knows for sure that the defendant is innocent. Hence, she will not take the case to trial (because of the negative utility associated with an innocent defendant's wrongful conviction), µ(q; s) = 0. The guilty defendant, knowing this, will want to deviate and reject the plea o¤er (choosing G(q) = 1, see equation (5)). This single deviation is pro…table because the guilty defendant is released as opposed to accepting a positive plea o¤er. Because a guilty defendant can gain from a single deviation this cannot be a separating equilibrium.
This result is not surprising and, in fact, justi…es the need for a court system. If the prosecutor could determine precisely a defendant's guilt or innocence through the plea bargaining process, she could always get the guilty to accept a plea o¤er equal to their expected sentence. Furthermore, she could also dismiss all cases against innocent defendants. It is the very fact that she is unable to do this which makes it necessary for a court system to exist. The court system provides a structure in which society determines a defendant's type. Much of the plea bargaining literature up to this point has shown plea bargaining to be bene…cial because it can induce separation. This paper shows that, although this view may be overly optimistic, plea bargaining is still bene…cial because under certain conditions the prosecutor can induce semi-separation of the defendant types. Furthermore, the power of the plea bargaining process depends critically on the resources available to the prosecutor.
In describing the equilibrium it is useful to partition all possible crimes into two intervals. Let
Equilibrium is pooling for all crimes in the interval [0; x). In this equilibrium the crime is so trivial that the prosecutor never goes to trial no matter what evidence signal she observes. Each defendant type, knowing this, naturally rejects any plea o¤er. Thus, any plea o¤er made by the prosecutor yields the same expected payo¤; hence, it is optimal.
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Proposition 2 If the value of the crime lies in the interval [0; x] then the following constitutes a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
Proof. In this pooling equilibrium all plea o¤ers are rejected and the prosecutor never goes to trial. By equation (3), it is clearly optimal to not go to trial after observing s, since ¹ [gjq; s] = 0 for all q. Not going to trial after observing s is optimal for the prosecutor if the following inequality holds:
Solving (7) for x yields the following condition:
Since the prosecutor never goes to trial, it is always optimal for both defendant types to reject a positive plea o¤er. Hence, the strategies of both defendant types are optimal.
Given that any plea will be rejected, and that the prosecutor will never go to trial, all plea o¤ers yield the prosecutor the same expected payo¤. Hence, any plea o¤er is optimal.
The prosecutor's beliefs are derived via Bayes rule from the equilibrium strategies of the players.
The most interesting case occurs when the crime lies in the interval (x; 1). First, we show that in this case there is no pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 3 If the value of the crime lies in the interval (x; 1), then there are no pooling equilibria in which both defendant types use the same strategy.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that both types of defendants use the same strategy. This strategy must involve rejecting some plea q with positive probability, because it cannot be optimal for the defendant to accept very large plea o¤ers. Let q be an o¤er that is rejected with positive probability. Then the prosecutor's beliefs if she observes s after a rejection of q must be
Since x > x, Equations (7) and (8) imply that the prosecutor will go to trial for sure. Given this strategy of the prosecutor, it is optimal for the guilty defendant to reject the plea q only if q¸q = ¼ g x+k. On the other hand, it is optimal for the innocent defendant to reject q only if q¸q = (1¡¾) (¼ i x + k). This implies that the pooling equilibrium strategy of the defendant must require that both types accept o¤ers q < q with probability one. However, even if the prosecutor always went to trial after a rejection and a signal s, the innocent defendant would prefer to deviate and reject any plea o¤er q > q. Since q > q, this clearly contradicts the assumption that both defendant types use the same strategy.
When the crime is in the interval (x; 1) the equilibrium is semi-separating. In this equilibrium some of the guilty defendants accept the plea o¤er, whereas all of the innocent and the remaining guilty defendants reject the plea o¤er. It is helpful in the formal characterization of this equilibrium to de…ne q as the guilty defendant's expected sentence (inclusive of court costs) if he rejects the plea o¤er and the prosecutor goes to trial after observing s,
The following proposition characterizes equilibrium for crimes x¸x. 
Proof. In the last stage of the game, after the rejection of the plea, the prosecutor does not go to trial whenever she observes s. By equation (3), this is clearly optimal, since ¹ [gjq; s] = 0 for all q. If she observes s after the rejection of a plea q > q, the prosecutor goes to trial with probability 1. For this to be optimal the payo¤ from trial must be greater than the payo¤ from dismissal; that is, the following inequality must hold:
Solving (9) for x yields
The prosecutor is indi¤erent between going to trial and not going to trial when she observes s after rejection of a plea q · q. For this to be optimal the following equality must hold:
Solving for°yields the following mixing probability for the guilty defendant:°=
Simple algebra shows that°lies in the interval (0; 1) provided that equation (10) holds.
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We now move to the second stage of the game, when the defendant must decide whether to accept or reject a plea o¤er. The guilty defendant rejects any plea above his expected sentence q = ¼ g x + k; this is clearly optimal, even though the prosecutor goes to trial after a rejection if she observes s. The guilty defendant randomizes between accept and reject when the plea o¤er is equal to or less than q. For this to be optimal the following equality must hold
Solving for µ ¤ (q; s) yields the mixing probability of the prosecutor at the trial decision stage.
The innocent defendant rejects any plea o¤er q. This is optimal since, for all q:
In the …rst stage of the game the prosecutor o¤ers a plea with sentence q ¤ = q = ¼ g x + k. For this to be optimal it must yield a higher expected payo¤ than any other plea o¤er. Recalling that on the equilibrium path the prosecutor is indi¤erent between going to trial and dismissing the case, the plea o¤er q yields a higher expected payo¤ than any o¤er q > q if and only if
Using equation (11) to replace the last term on the r.h.s. of the inequality and dividing by p yields
Rearranging and simplifying we …rst obtain
and then
which clearly holds. The plea o¤er q also yields a higher expected payo¤ than any o¤er q < q since
This concludes the proof.
The equilibrium path dictated by the equilibrium in Proposition 4 is as follows: (1) the prosecutor o¤ers a plea equal to the guilty defendant's expected sentence, inclusive of the cost of going to court; (2) a proportion of the guilty defendants accept this o¤er while the remaining guilty and all of the innocent reject it; (3) after a rejection of the plea, the prosecutor proceeds to trial if she observes the evidence signal she most commonly associates with guilty defendants and dismisses the case if she observes the evidence signal associated with innocent defendants. The expected payo¤s in this equilibrium to the innocent defendant, the guilty defendant, and the prosecutor are given by equations (12), (13), and (14) respectively There are several interesting aspects of the equilibrium strategies of the players in this game. First, the innocent defendant rejects all plea o¤ers. Upon rejection, the innocent defendant's expected sentence depends both on the probability of conviction and the probability that the prosecutor takes the case to trial upon observing a rejected plea o¤er. On the equilibrium path, the innocent defendant's expected sentence (inclusive of the cost of going to
is the probability the prosecutor observes the signal she most commonly associates with the guilty defendant (s) when the defendant is in fact innocent. Note that q falls as either the evidence signal becomes more clear or the probability of wrongful conviction falls. The evidence signal gets more clear when there is an increase in the available prosecutorial resources (M ).
The guilty defendants in this equilibrium randomize between accept and reject if the plea o¤er is less than or equal to their expected sentence at trial inclusive of the cost of going to court, and reject any o¤er greater than their expected sentence. This expected sentence is q = [¼ g x + k]. The randomization of the guilty defendants is what drives the semi-separation of the defendant types. Any defendant who accepts a plea o¤er is guilty, whereas any defendant who rejects a plea o¤er may or may not be guilty.
The evidence signal plays a role in determining the behavior of the guilty defendants. The proportion°of guilty defendants trying to mimic the behavior of the innocent defendants (by rejecting the plea o¤er) falls as the evidence signal gets stronger due to increased resources spent gathering evidence. Therefore, anticipated resource expenditures provide a credible threat. This threat increases the e¤ectiveness of the plea bargaining process by reducing the imitation of innocent defendant behavior by guilty defendants. The proportion°of guilty defendants rejecting the plea also decreases with the severity of the crime x and with the prior probability that the defendant is guilty p.
In this equilibrium the prosecutor always takes the case to trial when she observes s after a plea o¤er q > q, while she is indi¤erent between taking the case to trial and dismissing the case when she observes s after a plea o¤er q · q is rejected. In the latter case the prosecutor randomizes between going to trial and dismissing the case. This randomization provides the necessary credible threat by the prosecutor to induce guilty defendants to accept a positive plea o¤er. If she did not threaten to take a portion of these cases to trial, no guilty defendants would ever accept a positive plea o¤er and the semi-separating equilibrium would unravel. When the prosecutor observes s she never goes to trial no matter what has happened at the plea bargaining stage. After observing s, the prosecutor believes that the defendant is innocent. Thus, given her preferences, it is optimal to dismiss the case.
The prosecutor's optimal plea o¤er in this equilibrium is equal to the guilty defendant's expected sentence q. Intuitively, this is optimal for the following two reasons. First, if the prosecutor o¤ers a plea greater than the guilty defendant's expected sentence all of the defendants reject the plea. The prosecutor then goes to trial if she observes s. In this case, no guilty defendants have self selected out of the possibility of trial by accepting the plea o¤er. It is better for the prosecutor to have some of the guilty defendants accept the plea o¤er and thus save the potential trial costs. Second, if the prosecutor o¤ers a plea less than the guilty defendant's expected sentence and adjusts the probability of going to trial so as to induce mixing by the guilty defendants, then always the same proportion of guilty defendants accept the plea o¤er. In that case, it is optimal to o¤er the sti¤est possible plea that is compatible with mixing by the guilty defendants. That plea o¤er is the guilty defendant's expected sentence.
It should be clear at this point that none of our propositions are a¤ected by the fact that the prosecutor gathers evidence after the plea bargaining stage, as opposed to before. When the crime is small, x < x, the prosecutor never goes to trial, irrespective of what evidence she gathers. So, it does not matter when evidence is collected. When the crime is large, x > x, only a portion of the guilty defendants accept the plea o¤er and the prosecutor only goes to trial if the evidence is s. Guilty defendants know that the evidence collected by the prosecutor will not let them o¤ the hook. (This is due to our simplifying assumption that evidence gathering always generates the signal s when the defendant is guilty.) Thus, the plea that they are willing to accept and that the prosecutor will o¤er is the same, independent of whether the prosecutor has already collected evidence or will collect it after plea bargaining. This is also the reason why none of our results would change if we allowed another round of plea bargaining after the prosecutor has investigated.
So far, we have implicitly assumed that resource expenditure does not a¤ect the prosecutor's utility. If expending resources were costly, the prosecutor would dismiss the case without collecting evidence when the crime is small, x < x, because even the most incriminating evidence is not enough to induce her to go to trial. When the crime is large the prosecutor would want to gather evidence only after a plea has been rejected. In this way she would not have to spend resources gathering evidence in those cases where the guilty defendant accepts the plea.
A more general evidence gathering technology would allow for the prosecutor to mistakenly collect a non-incriminating low signal s, when the defendant is in fact guilty. In this case, since the prosecutor would be more inclined to go to trial, a guilty defendant would be willing to accept a sti¤er plea sentence after incriminating evidence s = s has been collected than before any evidence gathering. This e¤ect would lead the prosecutor to prefer collecting evidence before plea bargaining. However, a countervailing e¤ect would be present, pushing the prosecutor to prefer gathering evidence after plea bargaining. Some guilty defendants would be willing to accept a smaller plea o¤er, because the non-incriminating evidence collected, s = s, makes the prosecutor more reluctant to go to trial. Combining this second e¤ect with the resource saving e¤ect, lead us to conclude that gathering evidence after plea bargaining is optimal under a fairly wide range of circumstances.
Welfare Implications
A welfare question remains. Given our analysis, can we construct a better system than plea bargaining for determining a defendant's guilt or innocence? Given the strength of Proposition 1 (no possibility of separating equilibrium), it seems doubtful that any system will achieve complete separation of guilt and innocence. The lack of separation is due to the prosecutor dismissing charges against defendants that she knows are innocent. Note that this result does not rest on the assumption that the prosecutor cares about wrongful convictions. If we change the nature of the prosecutor's objective function so that she simply maximizes the number of convictions, she still will not want to take innocent people to trial. This is because innocent people are less likely to be convicted, and thus e¤ectively ruin a prosecutor's conviction rate. Therefore, many di¤erent objective functions lead to the same result.
The objective function of the prosecutor used in the model consists of two elements. First, the prosecutor wants to maximize the number of guilty defendants she puts in jail. Second, she wants to minimize the number of innocent defendants she puts in jail. It is easy to see that these two goals are part of the reasonable objectives of a social planner. However, it is possible that a social planner would also want to use the legal system to minimize the total amount of crime. To achieve this goal the social planner would have to know the relative deterrent value of trial convictions as opposed to plea convictions. This relative deterrent value is unclear, and a more general equilibrium model is needed to analyze this problem.
An agency problem also exists in the plea bargaining process. This problem occurs because the individual prosecutor's decisions (whether to o¤er plea bargains in more or less cases) do not necessarily coincide with the goals of the administration (who might be thought of as having the preferences of a social planner).
10 This point is easiest to see in regard to the Justice Department. The President might have a policy against plea bargaining because he thinks that the more cases taken to trial the greater the deterrent e¤ect -thus the less crime. An individual prosecutor in the United States Attorney's O¢ce might be wary of taking a case to trial because of her personal political fear that she may lose. Hence, she is more likely to plea bargain. Thus, an incentive problem exists. Simply put, the availability of plea bargaining, along with con ‡icting incentives, might make it di¢cult for the President to implement a particular policy to reduce crime. One could think of the "three strikes and your out laws" as methods by which the legislature has attempted to alleviate this incentive problem.
Concluding Remarks
Several conclusions concerning the plea bargaining process are derived from the model presented in this paper. First, it is impossible for the prosecutor to precisely determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant through the plea bargaining process. Second, the threat to gather evidence, or the actual gathering of evidence, reduces the proportion of guilty defendants that attempt to mimic the behavior of innocent defendants. Third, the proportion of guilty defendants that accept plea o¤ers increases with the severity of the crime. Fourth, prosecutors who value saving resources are apt to spend resources after plea bargaining. Fifth, the e¤ectiveness of the plea bargaining system hinges on the prosecutor's ability to credibly threaten to go to trial. As the size of the federal and state prosecutorial budgets are increased the gains from the plea bargaining system will also increase.
In future research it might be interesting to look at the way in which the prosecutor allocates her resources across di¤erent cases on her docket, and how this impacts the decision making process of each defendant. This relationship, to our knowledge, has not yet been investigated formally. Other future research could attempt to model how popular opinion impacts the plea bargaining process. For example, does a rash of drunk driving accidents stir public sentiment away from plea bargaining and toward imposing the maximum penalty on the defendant?
